## 1

#### TEXT

#### My partner and I advise the following: The United States Federal Judiciary should rule the Helms-Burton Act as Unconstitutional.

#### 1. The word “advocate” is a good word gone bad. It has strayed from helping people and use for visibility and publicity at the expense of the oppressed.

PICCININI 10. Carlo Piccinini, holds a Master’s Degree in Public Relations and Public Communication from the IULM University in Milan (Italy) and a MA in International Communications from the Institute of Communications Studies (ICS) - University of Leeds (UK).¶ From 1999 through 2007 he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and from 2002 served as Communication Delegate/Coordinator in the DR of Congo, Eritrea, Sudan (Darfur) and Côte d’Ivoire. From 1986 through 1997 he worked for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as Operations Officer (Rome), and Local Representative for Northern Italy (Milan).Advocacy: A good Word Gone Bad. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 21 February 2010. Section 3.1. MMG

This paper claims is that in today’s conflict-related humanitarian environment, advocacy has become a ‘good word gone bad’. In recent years, when referred to this field advocacy, especially in its public forms, seems to have progressively lost its original and positive connotations and simultaneously assumed growing negative significances. Nowadays, it appears to be away from its original people- and-their-suffering-centered orientation, largely interpreted in political terms, widely used with a ‘speaking out’ approach intended to publicly denounce rights-violating governments and increasingly associated with initiatives aiming at pure visibility goals. Arraying the exercise of influencing key players through advocacy on a continuum ranging from negotiations behind the scenes to public denunciation (Perrin 2002), many organizations seem to increasingly prefer the latter to the former. This ‘deviated’ interpretation and the widespread association of advocacy with the denunciation approach would rally a large consensus within the humanitarian community. Outside analysts seem also to implicitly recognize this deviation when they wonder whether “advocacy in Darfur has gone too far” (Gidley 2007) or when they highlight the need for a better understanding of both the role of agencies in advocacy and the effectiveness of this function (HPG 2007:1).

#### The net benefit is legitimate humanitarianism.

#### 2. The CP solves – “advocacy” fails to produce results that help the oppressed. Moral obligation to stop the subjugation and oppressive military intervention.

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In the humanitarian crises increasingly induced by politically-laden and intrastate conflicts five aspects seem to have both engendered additional challenges in the implementation of the rights-based advocacy as strategy and introduced some limits to its use. Firstly, in situations like the conflict ‘where the stomachs are empty’, talks about rights lack legitimacy (Uvin 2009). Secondly, the fact that the Human Rights Law (HRL) expresses its content largely in the genre of “manifesto” (Feinberg quoted in Finnis 1980:214) listing a series of “peremptory” and “conclusory”, “assertions” (Finnis 1980: 218) seems to have fostered a militant attitude in agencies’ advocacy efforts. Thirdly, in order to ‘come to earth’ this body of law requires to be translated into “specific three-term relations” (Finnis 1980: 218) in which the rights-holder(s) and the duty-bearer(s) are clearly indentified and the elements of the rights-duties equation clearly outlined (Finnis 1980: 218-9). Yet, while in the human rights system the accountability of the state is clearly defined as “the principal duty holder under international law” (Windfuhr 2000:35) the liability of the others duty-bearer(s) seems not. Harbored in their vague, split and morally impenetrable liability, humanitarian were in their ‘win-win position’ that allowed them to use the militant attitude and the accusatory tones in their advocacy while avoiding the blame. This approach has exacerbated their already challenging relationship with duty-holders. Fourthly, HRL is an international binding instrument for the signatory states but not for non-state actors (NSA). This appears to make the essence of the right-based advocacy workable with the former but unsuitable for the latter. Unless the NSA declares its sensitiveness to the HRL, any attempt of rights-based advocacy to use the denouncing tones would produce feeble results. Lastly, the fact that human rights form a single indivisible package and that they cannot be ranked on a hierarchical scale seems to weaken also the strategy of the right-based advocacy with the states. Uvin argues that in the reality of¶ the conflicts, where the needs are huge and the resources scarce, even the most committed government would face serious defies in implementing core rights such as the right to food (Uvin 2009). Advocating for impossible core rights would weaken the strategy. Advocating with less decisive tones for core rights difficult to implement due to the objective restrictions would justify exceptions that are simply unacceptable from both the RBA and HRL perspectives.

#### 3. The word “advise” solves better – it informs the oppressed people on courses of action but does not force it. And, “advocate” and “advise” are mutually exclusive.

ELITE 09. Enabling Living Independently Today and Everyday – a human rights group that publishes papers and articles on the various forms of humanitarianism. Advocacy Definition; <http://www.elitestaffordshire.co.uk/uploads/file/Advocacy%20Definition.pdf> MMG

Offers guidance and direction on a particular course of action which needs to be undertaken in order to realise a need, access a service or realise individual entitlements. (Rowntree, 2003: 9).¶ Advocacy is not interchangeable with giving information and advice. While an advocate does gather information and may show which of a number of alternatives are the most reliable and useful, they do not do not offer advice on¶ a decision or course of action they think to be in the best interests of the person.

## 2

#### The narrative of progress structures us foreign policy; it reduces complex social issues to simple technical linear problem/solutions – aff harms aren't true, they can't solve, and it turns case

Escobar 1995 [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page 52-53]

CONCLUSION The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a ﬁeld of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to inﬁnity. Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualiﬁed them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies ﬁt a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers’ apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality. At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an inﬁnite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, ﬁnally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulﬁlling the promises that development seemed to be making. After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, reﬁne its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of factors and forces in which the new language of development ﬁnds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artiﬁcial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories. The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World.26 Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identiﬁed by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signiﬁers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a ﬁxity as signiﬁeds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### Specifically, the aff invokes the narrative of progress:

#### Our impact is the biggest – the narrative of progress locks us into ignoring pressing economic, environmental, nuclear, and social issues that risk extinction because we believe our exceptionalism

Loewen 07(James W. "Jim" Loewen, American sociologist, historian, and author, University of Vermont, “Lies My Teacher Told Me”, page 285 – 286, 2007, RLA)

This is the America in which most textbook authors grew up and the America they still try to sell to students today. Perhaps textbooks do not question the notion that bigger is better because the idea of progress conforms with the way Americans like to think about education: arneliorative, leading step by step to opportunity for individuals and progress for the whole society. The ideology of progress also provides hope for the future. Certainly most Americans want to believe that their society has been, on balance, a boon and not a curse to mankind and to the planet. History textbooks go even further to imply that simply participating in society. Americans contribute to a notion that is constantly progressing and remains the hope of the world. As Boorstein and Kelley put it, near the end of A History of the United States, “ Americans – makers of something out of nothing – have delivered a new way of life to the far corners of the world.” Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism – the United States as the best country in the world – which starts in our textbooks with the Pilgrims, gets projected into the future. Faith in progress has played various functions in society and in American history textbooks. The faith has promoted the status quo in the most literal sense, for it proclaims that to progress we must simply do more of the same. This belief has been particularly useful to the upper class, because Americans would be persuaded to ignore the injustice of the social class if they thought the economic pie kept getting better for all. The idea of progress also fits in with social Darwinism, which implies that lower class lower owing to its own fault. Progress as an ideology has been intrinsically antirevolutionary: because things are getting better all the time, everyone should believe in the system. Portraying America so optimistically also helps textbooks with stand attacks by unpatriotic critics in Texas and other textbook adaptation states. Internationally, referring to have not countries as “developing nations” has helped the “developed nations” avoid facing the injustice of worldwide stratification. In reality “development” has been making Third World Nations poorer, compared to the First World. Per capita income in the First World was five times that in the Third Word in 1850, ten times in 1960, and fourteen times by 1970. It’s tricky to measure these ratios, partly because a dollar buys more in the Third World than in the First, but per capita income in the First world is now twenty to sixty times that in the Third World, The vocabulary of progress remains relentlessly hopeful, however, with regard to the “undeveloped.” As economist E.J. Mishan put it, “Complacency is suffused over the globe, by referring to these destitute and sometimes desperate countries by the fatuous no – menclature of ‘develiping nations.’ In the nineteenth century, progress provided an equally splendid rational for imperialism. Europeans and Americans saw themselves as performing government services for utilizing natural resources of natives in distant lands who were to backward to do it themselves. ¶ Almost every day brings new reasons for ecological concerns, from deforestation to the equator to ozone holes at the poles. Cancer rates climb and we don’t know why. We have no way to measure the full extend of human impact on earth . The average sperm count in healthy human males around the world has dropped nearly 50 percent over the past fifty years. If environmentally caused, this is no laughing matter, for sperm have only to decline in a straight line for another fifty years and we will have wiped out human kind without knowing how we did it. We Were similarly unaware for years that killing mosquitoes with DDT was wiping out birds of prey around the globe. Our increasing power makes it increasingly possible that humankind will make the earth uninhabitable by accident. Indeed, we almost have on several occasions. In the early 1990s, for example nations around the planet agreed to stop production of CFGs that damaged the ozone in the upper atmosphere. In 2006 Washington Post writer Joel Achenbach noted, “Scientists are haunted by realization that if CFCs had been made with a slightly different type of chemistry they’d have destroyed much of the ozone layer over the entire planet. We were simply lucky. All these considerations imply that more of the same economic development and nation state governance that brought us this far may not guide us to a livable planet in the long run. We do not simply face an energy crisis that might be solved if we only develop low – cost energy that does not pollute or cause global warming. On the contrary, if we had cheaper energy, imagine the havoc we might cause! Scientists have already envisioned how we could happily use it to decrease salinity of the seas, increase our arable Land, and in other ways make our planet nicer for us – in the short run. Instead, we must start treating the earth as if we plan to stay here. At some point in the future, perhaps before readers of today’s high school textbooks pass their fifteenth birthdays. Industrialized nations, including the United States may move towards steady state economies in their consumption of energy and raw materials. Thus, our oil crisis can best be viewed as a wake up call to change our ways. Second our use of oil (and all other fossil fuels) has a serious worldwide impact: global warming, As everyone knows, except some high school history textbook authors, this warming melts the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to rise. Oceans rose one foot in the last century. The most conservative estimates, embraced by the George W Bush Administration, predicts they will rise another three feet in this century. Around the world --- from Mexico to Venace to much of Bangladesh – hundreds of millions of people live close enough to sea level that this rise will endager their lives and occupations. The resulting dislocation will constitute the biggest crisis mankind has faced since the beginning a recorded history. And this is the most pleasant estimate. If the Greenland Ice Sheet Ricses the ocean may rise twenty three feet. Scientists James Lovelock in 1970 famously invented the “Gaia Hypothesus,” the idea that the earth acts as a homeostatic system. Recently Lovelock has pointed out that as Earth’s equilibrium gets disturbed, some disequilibrium processes may cause even faster warming. As the polar ice cap melts, for example , they no longer reflect the son’s rays, so the earth absorbs more heat. Lovelock predicts the death of billions of people before the equilibrium is established once more. Global warming also increases other weather problems: the average windspeeds of hurricanes have doubled in the past thirty years, and they are also more frequent. That’s not all. Evidence shows that carbon dioxide, a normal result of burning oil or coal, also makes oceans more acidic. Scientists warn that, by the end of the century, this acididty could decimate coral reefs and kill of creates that undergurd the sea’s food chain. “It’s the single most profound environmental change I’ve ever learned about in my entire career,” said Thomas Lovejoy, author of Climate Change and Biodivdersity. What we’re doing in the next decade will affect our oceans for millions of years,” said Ken Caldeira, oceanographer at Stanford University. In addition to our energy and global warming crises we face other severe problems. Thousands of species face imminent extinction. One list of likely canidadates includes a third of all amphibians, a fourth of the world’s mammals, and an eight of its birds. Wilson thinks the foregoing is optimistic and believes two thirds of all species will perish before the end of the century. Nuclear proliferation poses another threat. In 1945 only one country – the United States had the know how and economic means to build nuclear weapons. Since then, Great Britian, the USSR, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and apparently North Korea have joined the nuclear club. If Pakistan and North Korea can do it, clearly almost every nation on earth – and some private organizations, including terrorist groups has the capacity. The United States cam uncomfortably close to using nuclear weapons in Vietnam in 1969, and India and Pakistan came uncomfortably close to using them against each other in 2002. In the long run just keeping to the old paths regarding all these new problems is unlikely to work. “From the mere fact that humanity has survived to the present, no hope for the future can be salvaged,” Mushan noted. “The human race can only perish once.¶

#### Vote neg – refusing the narrative of progress is necessary to allow Latin American pedagogical movements to rise up to check dominant narratives of exceptionalism

**Rosenberg ‘6,** Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Comparative Literature at Brandeis (Fernando J., The Avant-garde and Geopolitics in Latin America, Google Books, p. 1-6, njw)

**THIS BOOK is about the avant-gardes of Latin America and their critique of modernity**.1 **Rather than engaging in the construction of an alternative modernity** or attempting to renegotiate the modern in relation to the traditional, **these vanguardists**, I contend, **sought to produce a critique of the modern as a global project.**¶ **From the perspective of a narrative of progress, Latin America seems to be cast** either **as a relic from the primitive past** **or as an unrealized but promising future**. **The linear temporality of the Judeo-Christian tradition**— "ascending, descending, progressive or regressive," as Gianni Vattimo (1992, 87) characterizes it—**and its modern varieties**—evolution, decadence, revolution, and novelty—**were** as **deeply embedded in the Latin American discourses of emancipation as they were in every project of modernity**. **But** the difference that the avant-gardes opened to inquiry, a difference that cannot be reduced to the contours of "cultural difference" in the traditional anthropological sense, is that **at both ends of the foundational narrative**—the promise of the future and redemption through and of the past—**Latin American discourse reencountered itself as subject to a larger order**. It is **as if the various futurisms and primitivisms that European movements displayed in an attempt to articulate a reaction against a bourgeois, conservative order** (to express it in blatantly vanguardistic terms) **were untenable from the Latin American position**. For the Latin American avant-gardes, **these alternatives kept referring back to the subaltern situation of Latin Americans themselves vis-a-vis the idea of the West**, a concept that neither clearly included nor excluded Latin America.-¶ **From this position, Latin American avant-gardes could undertake** a critique of modernity and its narratives**, including those of "international"**1 **modernism** and its avant-gardes, **but along a different axis, not through rushing the temporalities of progress** forward or through a return to primitive origins. **Instead, they developed narratives of space that articulated the Latin American situation in a shifting world order.** Some European avant-gardes movements (cubism, dadaism, surrealism, etc.) attempted to undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment and its foundation in the white man as the model of rationality and historical agency under the direction of universal, abstract progress. **Because of their investment in modernity and their peripheral position in its foundational narratives**, however, **Latin Americans were forced to level their criticism through and with a particular attentive-ness to spatial issues** that addressed this problematic inclusion but that were repressed by the same idea of progress that they embraced.¶ This is not to say that Latin American avant-gardes were at any point more "advanced" than their European counterparts. While they tried to unravel European cultural supremacy, European avant-gardes usually remained attached to an assumption of their own universality. Artistic flights overseas were one way in which this was expressed, as the search for non-Western ways of life and perception became an exploration into the repressed soul of the universal human. For Latin American avant-gardists, (many times, no doubt, inspired by the Europeans), that position was untenable because the process of "discovery" was carried out under the suspicion of reproducing colonial dynamics. Therefore, **tracking down influences and assessing the degree to which Latin American movements followed or did not follow European movements, as has been done repeatedly, misses the point and reproduces a colonial logic of unilinear development that**, as we will see, **Latin American avant-gardes tried to destabilize**.¶ Vicky Unruh rightly argues in her seminal book Latin American Vanguards (1994) that **these movements overcame an idea of national and/or continental identity as rooted in an original nature and landscape**.4 What Peter Burger in his Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) called the nonorganic character of the work of art, that is, the possibility of assembling different components with no final resolution of the internal tensions, is akin to this moment in which identity was conceived as a collage (Unruh, chapter 3). The connection Unruh makes between the collagelike constitution of the work of art and issues of national and continental identity is compelling, since ideas of hybridism, transculturation, and cultural anthropophagy or cannibalization—conceptual tools that the avant-gardes favored—traversed the twentieth-century Latin American discussion. But to what degree did the vanguards represent only another step in the constitution of national or regional identities? No doubt, the different movements and writers are inevitably embedded in national traditions. But some **texts of the vanguards**, I propose, **suggest that the question of identity is intertwined with a redefinition of the location of discourses about it in the context of a global negotiation.** In these texts, the problem of loci of enunciation—that is, the conditions of possibility for Latin American artists and writers to intervene in the larger debate about modernity—takes precedence and redefines the problem of identity.¶ **As part of a geopolitical shift that, with the advent of World War I, shook loose the assumptions of nineteenth-century liberal culture, the avant-gardists in Latin America explored** the limits of **a** national, **culturalist response to crisis of the universality of civilization**. The concern of the national Creole elite in the constitution of its hegemony—namely, how to organize the nation (or Latin America, for that matter) so as to inscribe its culture more firmly in the annals of universal history—was for the first time left in suspense, owing to the war that put an end to the nineteenth century's faith in the rationality of European history and the worldwide projection.¶ Since literary criticism in Latin America was by and large engaged in the travails of the national cultural elite, I intend to open up the vanguard texts to this different set of concerns, shedding light by the same token on the makeup of that critical tradition. **I am interested in the moments of interruption when vanguard experiments called attention to contemporary places of identification and symbolic production that were neither national cultures nor reducible to them. Such interruptions occurred as** literary discourses **exhibited an openness to planetary concerns** that resulted in an exploration of vanguardistic ambition. As a result, the vanguards were led to recognize the indebtedness of literary discourses to the reproduction of colonial perspectives and to occupy positions of utterance that they imagined to dislodge this coloniality.¶ "From 1922 (the date is tentative, it is a situation of consciousness that has been defining itself little by little) all that has ended," writes Jorge Luis Borges (1926,15), the vanguardist, in reference to the sea change that set in motion a Latin American artistic and intellectual field that would no longer voice "our longing for Europe."5 Without attempting to reduce cultural production to a set of contextual conditions, I want to point out certain major historical trends that framed this alternative imaginary. The 1920s and 1930s were decades when the political order was reconfigured as the consequence of an ongoing change in the global geopolitical balance following World War I. It was a time of increasing democratization in the Latin American social space, but it was also an era of new pacts between conservative forces in different national arenas. The upheavals and revolutions that provoked regime changes in more than one national context at the end of the 1920s differed in character, yet they shared a common soil, as historian Tulio Halperin Donghi (1996, 371) makes clear:¶ The world crises that erupted in 1929 had an immediate and devastating impact in Latin America, the loudest sign of which was the collapse, between 1930 and 1933, of the majority of the political situations that had consolidated during the good times that came before. What was not immediately evident was that the crash differed from previous complications along the way not only in terms of its unprecedented intensity; this crisis ushered in a new era in which the painful solutions that had allowed the continent to incorporate itself into an increasingly global economy proved ineffectual. 6¶ We are not referring to a discrete event but to a broad historical pattern that subtly undermined faith in the viability of national autonomy as a way to frame, understand, and localize the production of culture. The question of what might constitute Latin Americas possibilities, its conditions of cultural production in this "increasingly global economy," was at stake in many avant-garde texts of the early 1920s.¶ A parallel demographic change touched on the imaginary of positive modernity and its inception in foundational national narratives. The rural-urban balance of power on which modernity as spatial conquest was carried out (that is, the city as a model of govern mentality whose effects were to be projected onto the rest of the territory) was unsettled with the formation of what the historian Jose Luis Romero (1986, chapter 7) called the "massified city." Major demographic changes were already occurring in many Latin American cities and had produced an overall change in the cultural landscape at the end of the nineteenth century. But the vanguard movements were the first artistic enterprises of the cultural elite that didn't react to this shift with strategies of domination, separation, or rejection. Instead, in an effort to cross the "great divide" between mass culture and elite culture, they integrated with and accommodated themselves to the logic of mass production and consumption.' The well-studied phenomena of unabashed promotion of artistic movements, the circulation of ideas through magazines, the interest in new media, and the political engagement with increasingly visible nonelite subjects can all be traced back to the vanguards' attempts to break through the narrowly conceived boundaries of literary culture.¶ This change of cultural practices entailed a broader concern with what I will call positionality. **At a time when the hierarchies embedded in** a notion of a progress **that** promised to spread from center to periphery **and from city to countryside were being questioned, some cultural actors found themselves** **needing to gauge new configurations of production, circulation, and consumption within an expanded horizon, a world-system of attribution of cultural value and meaning. Countering modernity as a merely expansionist force**, to the unilinearity of universal history, **Latin American artistic movements** **would continue to posit places of resistance to anchor their identities in the midst of historical flows**. **Consequently**, the elemental refuge of the baroque rain forest that magically eschews **Western** categories or the boundary-less hinterlands that haunt the gaze of the observer, though refractory of **positivist** **discourse, would continue to be revamped** (by early travelers of the nineteenth century, regional writers of the early twentieth century, and practitioners of magic realism) as a cornerstone of cultural formation. But **the avant-gardes opened the possibility of a different strategy**. Amid so much praise and condemnation of speed and transportation as icons of the universalized, homogeneously modern abolition of spatial constraints, **the vanguards elaborated, for the first time, their own loci of enunciation imbricated in the circulation of goods, discourses, and peoples**. Two seminal manifestos of the early 1920s—one Argentinean, the other Brazilian—are exemplary in that regard:¶ A single struggle—the struggle for the way. Lets divide it up: poetry for import. And Brazilwood poetry for export. (Schwartz 1991, 138)¶ Martin Fierro accepts the consequences and responsibilities of situating oneself. . . . Instructed on his antecedents, his anatomy, the meridian on which he walks, he consults the barometer, the calendar, before stepping into the street in order to live it with the nerves and mentality of nowadays... .8 To accentuate and to expand to the rest of the intellectual activities, the independent movement in language initiated by [poet] Ruben Dario doesn't mean .. . that we will renounce, much less pretend not to recognize, that every morning we use Swiss tooth paste, French towels, and English soap (Schwartz 1991, H3-I4)-9¶ **Two native, national products**, one commercial ("Brazilwood," the first Brazilian export to the metropolis and the source of the regions name) and one cultural (Martin Fierro, the mythic character in the epic poem about an autochthonous gaucho as a founder of Argentinean nationality) **are not only the anchor for a renewed nationalism**, as has been argued widely, **but also become vantage points from which to understand an expanded geopolitics.** **The map projected to elaborate this position needs to be altogether different from the one inherited from the period of nation-state formation**. **The modern and the new**, so the "Manifesto Martin Fierro" seems to claim, **necessarily come from an elsewhere that also has the power to define modernity and its others**, whereas the "Brazilwood manifesto" foregrounds the fact that **what stands as artistically new also depends on a sort of validation that is not at all foreign to a global circulation of commodities**.

## 3

#### A. 1AC USES WEAK DATA AS THE METHOD FROM WHICH TO MAKE PREDICTIONS

Rosekind 09

[Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D Kevin B. Gregory Alertness Solutions The Moebus Aviation Report on "Scientific and Medical Evaluationof Flight Time Limitations": Invalid, Insufficient, and Risky Alertness SolutionsJanuary 2009]

While the extensive scientific literature on fatigue has definitively established its role in reducing alertness, performance, and safety, there remains a significant and critical gap in the scientific data available to address policy issues and provide specific solutions. There are few studies that have specifically tested an alertness strategy/fatigue countermeasure or compared an established regulatory policy to an alternative or quantified the benefits of implementing an Alertness Management Program (AMP)/Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). Regulatory authorities continually confront this gap between the science establishing fatigue as a significant safety issue and having data to address policy issues or provide specific solutions in their efforts to address fatigue risks through policymaking. EASA's request for scientific and medical evaluation of 18 specific flight time limitation questions is one more example of such an effort. However, the resulting MAR addressing the 18 posed questions is invalid, insufficient, and risky. The following highlights some of the most significant and relevant issues in each of these areas.

I. Invalid

a. No data. In 13 of the 18 questions posed there is direct acknowledgement that no data is available to address the question or the data that are cited do not specifically address the question posed. Therefore, 73% of the questions do not have any data or relevant,appropriate data to provide an evaluation of the issue identified (e.g., #1, 6, 10, 13).

b. Recommendations without data . Though acknowledging no data or no relevant data are available, specific recommendations are still made to address the questions posed. The primary task identified was to provide a scientific and medical evaluation of the questions posed, however, the MAR goes beyond this tasking to provide specific recommendations intended for policy making .These recommendations were not data-driven and relied on generalizing from other information to fill the "data gap" . However, the recommendations are presented in a manner to suggest that they could be used for data based policies.

c. Subjective data sources . A significant number of the scientific citations used to substantiate specific points were studies that utilized only subjective , self-reporting measures. Subjective, self-report measures can be discrepant from objective measures of alertness and performance, biased, and influenced by varied sources. It is critical that scientific data used as a basis for policy making be based on objective , measurable outcomes related to performance, relevant operational variables, behavioral actions,errors, incidents, accidents and appropriate safety measures. Subjective measures can complement these other varied objective outcomes but are highly questionable as the exclusive source for an evaluation or recommendation. For example, the MAR cites previous NASA research related to a subjective survey on sleep quantity and quality in onboard crew rest/bunk facilities (1). Yet the MAR does not include a complementary NASA study that included objective physiological measures of sleep quantity and quality in onboard rest facilities during actual operations involving two different flight patterns and three different aircraft (2).

d. Ignores operational experience and safety history. While a scientific and medical evaluation of the 18 questions posed is relevant, equally relevant is the operational experience and safety history of the activities being addressed. Policy making to address established safety issues could consider safety data, operational experience, relevant scientific findings, and where appropriate, economic factors. When the MAR goes beyond scientific and medical evaluation to make "practical" recommendations, it enters a realm where these other relevant factors (safety data, operational experience, 'economics, etc.) become significant considerations.

e. No quantification of risk/benefit . In policy-making efforts, it is critical to go beyond documentation of an effect to quantifying specifics of the risk . Regarding fatigue, this translates into both quantifying the risk and identifying the specific areas where these risks are expressed. First, this allows decisions about what specific fatigue-related risks to address and their priorities . Second, it provides a basis for determining expected,quantifiable benefits and outcomes that could be measured by implementing policies and activities . The MAR expert panel made an effort to use this approach in a couple of its responses (e.g., #2, 12). However, the quantification of risks and subsequent, quantifiable benefits of implementing policies and recommendations should be the lead issue in addressing all of the questions posed .

#### THE IMPACT IS TWO FOLD

#### (1) EPISTEMOLOGY – ASSUME THE 1AC SOLVENCY, UNIQUENESS AND IMPACTS HAVE ZERO PERCENT PROBABILITY BECAUSE THEY USE WEAK DATA

Zellner 07

[Arnold Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago Philosophy and objectives of econometrics Journal of Econometrics Volume 136, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 331-339]

On the relation of science and econometrics, I have for long emphasized the unity of science principle, which Karl Pearson put forward as follows: the unity of science is a unity of methods employed in analyzing and learning from experience and data. The subject matter discipline may be economics, history, physics, or the like, but the methods employed in analyzing and learning from data are basically the same. As (Jeffreys, 1957) and (Jeffreys, 1967) expresses the idea, “There must be a uniform standard of validity for all hypotheses, irrespective of the subject . Different laws may hold in different subjects, but they must be tested by the same criteria ; otherwise we have no guarantee that our decisions will be those warranted by the data and not merely of inadequate analysis or of believing what we want to believe . ” Thus the unity of science principle sets the same standards for work in the natural and social sciences. For example, this range of considerations is particularly relevant for those in economics who cross-correlate variables and assert causation on the basis of such correlations alone (See Zellner (1979a) for consideration of such tests and of alternative definitions of causality) or those who carelessly test all hypotheses in the “5% accept–reject syndrome.” Also, we must emphasize the importance of a general unified set of methods for use in science and the undesirability of unnecessary jargon and ad hoc methods.

Given that we take the unity of science principle seriously, we may next ask what are the main objectives of science. As Karl Pearson, Harold Jeffreys, and others state, one of the main objectives of science , and I add of econometrics, is that of learning from our experience and data. Knowledge so obtained may be sought for its own sake, for example, to satisfy our curiosity about economic phenomena and/or for practical policy and other decision purposes. One part of our knowledge is merely description of what we have observed; the more important part is generalization or induction, that is that part which “... consists of making inferences from past experience to predict future [or as yet unobserved] experience,” as Jeffreys puts it.

Thus there are at least two components to our knowledge, description and generalization or induction. While generalization or induction is usually considered to be more important, description plays a significant role in science, including economics. For example, Burns and Mitchell's monumental NBER study Measuring Business Cycles is mainly descriptive but valuable in providing general features of business cycles about which others can generalize . While some have damned this work as “measurement without theory ,” the opposite sin of “ theory without measurement” seems much more serious. In fact there are too many mathematical economic theories which explain no past data and which are incapable of making predictions about future or as yet unobserved experience. Such economic theories are mathematical denk-spielen and not inductive generalizations to which I referred above. Further, I shall later mention another important role for description in connection with reductive inference.

In learning from our experience and data, it is critical that we understand the roles and nature of three kinds of inference, namely, deductive inference, inductive inference, and reductive inference.

As regards deductive inference, Reichenbach (1958) explains, “Logical proof is called deduction; the conclusion is obtained by deducing it from other statements, called the premises of the argument. The argument is so constructed that if the premises are true the conclusions must also be true. ... It unwraps, so to speak, the conclusion that was wrapped up in the premises.” Clearly, much economic theory is an exercise in deductive inference. However, the inadequacies of deductive inference for scientific work must be noted. First, traditional deductive inference leads just to the extreme attitudes of proof, disproof, or ignorance with respect to propositions. There is no provision for a statement like “A proposition is probably true” in deductive inference or logic. This is a deficiency of deduction for scientific work wherein such statements are very widely employed and found to be useful. Second, deduction or deductive inference alone provides no guide for choice among logically correct alternative explanations or theories. As is well known, for any given set of data, there is an infinity of models which fit the data exactly. Deduction provides no guide for selection among this infinity of models.

Thus, there is a need for a type of inference which is broader than deductive inference and which yields statements less extreme than deductive inference . This type of inference is called inductive inference by Jeffreys. It enables us to associate probabilities with propositions and to manipulate them in a consistent, logical way to take account of new information. Deductive statements of proof and disproof are then viewed as limiting cases of inductive logic wherein probabilities approach one or zero, respectively.

Jeffreys (1967), who has made major contributions to the development of inductive logic in his book Theory of Probability states that inductive inference involves “ making inferences from past experience to predict future experience ” by use of inductive generalizations or laws . And given actual outcomes, the procedures of inductive inference allow us to revise probabilities associated with inductive generalizations or laws to reflect the information contained in new data .

Note that for Jeffreys induction is not an economical description of past data, as Mach suggested since Mach omitted the all-important predictive aspect of induction. Further, predictive inductive inferences have an unavoidable uncertainty associated with them, as Hume pointed out many years ago. For example, it is impossible to prove, deductively or inductively that generalizations or laws, even the Chicago quantity theory of money , are absolutely true . Even Newton's laws, which were considered “ absolutely true ” by many physicists in the nineteenth century, have been replaced by Einstein's laws. Thus there is an unavoidable uncertainty associated with laws in all areas of science, including economics. Inductive logic provides a quantification of this uncertainty by associating probabilities with laws and providing logically consistent procedures for changing these probabilities as new evidence arises . In this regard, probability is viewed as representing a degree of reasonable belief with the limiting values of zero being complete disbelief or disproof and of one being complete belief of proof.

For Jeffreys, Bayesian statistics is implied by his theory of scientific method. Thus, Bayesian statistics is the technology of inductive inference. The operations of Bayesian statistics enable us to make probability statements about parameters ’ values and future values of variables . Also, optimal point estimates and point predictions can be readily obtained by Bayesian methods. Probabilities and/or odds ratios relating to competing hypotheses or models can be evaluated which reflect initial information and sample information. Thus, many inference problems encountered in induction can be solved by Bayesian methods and these solutions are compatible with Jeffreys's theory of scientific method. See, e.g., Berry et al. (1996), Box and Tiao (1973), DeGroot (1970), Fienberg and Zellner (1975) and (Zellner, 1971) and (Zellner, 1979b) for presentations, discussions and applications of Bayesian methods.

To illustrate inductive inference in econometrics, consider Milton Friedman's Theory of the Consumption Function . In his book Friedman set forth a bold inductive generalization which, he showed, explained variation in much past data, a fact that increased most individuals ’ degree of reasonable belief in his theory. Further, Friedman proposed a number of additional tests of his model and predicted their outcomes, an example of what we referred to above as inductive inference . Many of these tests have been performed with results compatible with Friedman's predictions. Such results enhance the degree of reasonable belief that we have in Friedman's theory. This is the kind of research in economics and econometrics , which illustrates well the nature of inductive inference and is, in my opinion, most productive .

As regards inductive generalizations, there are a few points, which deserve to be emphasized. First, a useful starting point for inductive generalization in many instances is the proposition that all variation is considered random or nonsystematic unless shown otherwise . A good example of the fruitfulness of such a starting point is given by the random walk hypothesis for stock prices in stock market research. Many researchers have put forward models to forecast stock prices by use of variables such as auto sales, changes in money, and the like only to find that their forecasts are no better than those yielded by a random walk model. In other areas, when a researcher proposes a new effect, the burden is on him to show that data support the new effect . The initial hypothesis is thus, “ No effect unless shown otherwise . ”

#### ASSIGNING WEAK DATA A NON-ZERO PERCENT CROWS OUT STRONG DATA BECAUSE OF TIME SKEW

Reuter 86

[Peter Reuter Senior Economist in the Washington Office of the Rand Corporation.THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE DEMAND FOR QUANTIFICATION Journal of Policy Analysis and Management Volume 5 Issue 4, Pages 807 - 812] [ct]

But in other areas of social policy , the expert community is small , not quantitative or ill-informed. The advocates often make initial estimates of the scale of a problem. Such numbers frequently have obscure origins in data drawn from confidential or proprietary sources with vague descriptions of how the data were used. The report of the 1970 Commission on Product Safety, which announced 20 million product-caused injuries, is a good example; it is difficult to determine how these numbers were produced or what they really measure.10 Another instance was the estimate of huge revenues generated by illegal drug transactions, some $80-100 billion in 1980 according to the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee." These numbers helped fuel the demand for enormous increases in federal resources for combatting drug traffic. Precisely because these numbers are the first estimates of what-ever they purport to measure, they often achieve great prominence. Congressional hearings will cite them, newspapers will re-port them; their propounders and advocates will obtain at least fleeting fame, if not lasting fortune. If the numbers come from agencies, they will help those agencies increase their share of the budget. The bad estimates are produced at least partly because good estimates are so difficult to make in these areas . It is easy to point to the failings of the first "measurement" but often hard to pro-duce a convincing alternative . Later, more serious researchers dis close the weaknesses of their data sources and the assumptions required to generate the estimates and consequently are criticized by the advocates of the earlier figure. In this case we have a minor variation on the standard Gresham's law: the bad but obscure will drive out (or prevent the creation of) the serious but explicit . In the case of drug revenues there is a now a small critical literature'' but the difficulty of producing better estimates has limited the efficacy of that criticism.

#### THE ALTERNATIVE IS EXPLICIT DISCLOSURE OF STRONG DATA

#### STRONG DATA REQUIRES (1) THE DATA USED AND (2) A REGRESSION TABLE

#### **A REGRESSION TABLE MUST INCLUDE** THE SAMPLE SIZE, THE MODEL AND VARIABLES USED, T STATISTICS, BETA COEFFICIENTS, AND R-SQUARED

Wooldridge 02

[Jeffrey Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, previously Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. Economics, UCSD; Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach 2nd Edition. Pages 150-1]

We end this chapter by providing a few guidelines on how to report multiple regression results for relatively complicated empirical projects. This should teach you to read published works in the applied social sciences, while also preparing you to write your own empirical papers. We will expand on this topic in the remainder of the text by reporting results from various examples, but many of the key points can be made now. Naturally, the estimated OLS coefficients should always be reported. For the key variables in an analysis, you should interpret the estimated coefficients (which often requires knowing the units of measurement of the variables). For example, is an esti- mate an elasticity, or does it have some other interpretation that needs explanation? The economic or practical importance of the estimates of the key variables should be discussed.

The standard errors should always be included along with the estimated coefficients. Some authors prefer to report the t statistics rather than the standard errors (and often just the absolute value of the t statistics). While nothing is really wrong with this, there is some preference for reporting standard errors. First, it forces us to think carefully about the null hypothesis being tested; the null is not always that the population parameter is zero. Second, having standard errors makes it easier to compute confidence intervals.

The R-squared from the regression should always be included. We have seen that, in addition to providing a goodness-of-fit measure, it makes calculation of F statistics for exclusion restrictions simple. Reporting the sum of squared residuals and the standard error of the regression is sometimes a good idea, but it is not crucial. The number of observations used in estimating any equation should appear near the estimated equation. If only a couple of models are being estimated, the results can be summarized in equation form, as we have done up to this point. However, in many papers, several equations are estimated with many different sets of independent variables. We may estimate the same equation for different groups of people, or even have equations explaining different dependent variables. In such cases, it is better to summarize the results in one or more tables. The dependent variable should be indicated clearly in the table, and the independent variables should be listed in the first column. Standard errors (or t statistics) can be put in parentheses below the estimates.

#### STRONG DATA CAN SOLVE EPISTOMOLOGY –

#### REGRESSION MODELS MAKE ACCURATE PREDICTIONS

Braumoeller & Sartori 02

[Bear F. Braumoeller, Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and Anne E. Sartori , Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University 6 Empirical-Quantitative Approaches to the Study of International Relations in Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods edited by Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky REVISED, November 2002]

Advantages of the Statistical Method

One advantage of the statistical method is that it permits political scientists to aggregate information from a tremendous number of cases. This advantage is perhaps so obvious that its importance is often overlooked. To comprehend its magnitude we need only imagine trying to make sense of a thousand surveys of individual attitudes, beliefs, voting behavior, etc., without the aid of statistics. The ability to extract even basic summary statistics from such a mass of data is immensely valuable: even something as unsophisticated as a sample mean—say, per capita GNP—conveys a wealth of information in compact and understandable form.

The ability to aggregate information is a potent stimulus for theorizing. Theory development often begins when a researcher uncovers an empirical puzzle that remains unexplained by prior theory (Lave and March 1993). Such a puzzle leads to a search for an explanation, and eventually to new or better-developed theory. A puzzle can emerge from a single case, but the researcher often would like to know whether or not it indicates a prevalent pattern of behavior. Only statistics can provide the answer to this question.2

For example, statistical analyses indicate that a number of pairs of states (e.g., India and Pakistan) engage in a disproportionate number of wars (Goertz and Diehl 1992). The empirical discovery of this phenomenon, which the literature terms “enduring rivalry,” has led to a number of attempts to explain the behavior of this set of dyads (e.g. Vasquez 1995; Bennett 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000): what is it that makes states become rivals; why do rivals fight so often; and how do rivalries end?

The use of statistics also makes the terms of a given debate more explicit. Inference requires assumptions, whether implicit or explicit; statistics force scholars to be quite explicit about the nature of at least some assumptions. Transparency is valuable both because assumptions should be as clear as possible and because one can compensate for violated assumptions if they are understood.3

In addition to standards of inference, the use of statistics necessarily entails standards of evidence. Even the most scrupulous researcher can be hard-pressed to avoid selectively evidence that would contradict his or her theory. Here, too, standardization is an asset; the need for coding procedures forces the researcher to be explicit about criteria for measurement and mitigates the human tendency to notice only trends that are consistent with the theory under investigation. Quantification can be a considerable boon both to reliability and validity: in the former case, explicit tests of reliability can flag unacceptably “noisy” measures, while in the latter details of the coding process make it clear what is, and is not, being measured.4For example, the Polity democracy index is an aid to scholars because the coding rules are quite specific and reliability can be calculated.

Statistical techniques also permit us to assess the claim that observed associations among variables are due to chance. Such assessments are critical to the testing of theory, and they are often very difficult to make. The statistical method can make the task almost trivially easy. For example, the extent to which any given Third World country votes with the United States in the U.N. will naturally vary from year to year; as a result, it can be difficult to determine whether an increase or decrease following a change in domestic political regime is an indicator of realignment or simply the product of random fluctuation. Absent the ability to assess the odds that such fluctuations are due to chance, analysts could argue endlessly over their substantive significance.5 Hagan (1989) addresses this question by testing to determine whether mean voting scores under a given regime differ significantly from mean voting scores under its successor; in about half of the 87 cases he examines, he finds that random fluctuation is a highly improbable (p<0.05) explanation for the difference in voting patterns across regimes. Although statistical testing does not answer the question with perfect certainty, it gives far more precise answers than could otherwise be obtained. In so doing it dramatically narrows potential areas of disagreement.

By answering the question of whether observed associations are the plausible result of chance, the statistical method also permits us to draw causal inferences. Using statistics, one can investigate ancillary associations implied by a posited causal process and assess the probability that these associations are due to chance.6 Because international relations scholars constantly seek to understand why actors behave as they do, this ability is perhaps the method’s greatest contribution to the discipline. To continue the above example, one might wonder not just whether a given country’s U.N. votes coincide to a greater or lesser degree with those of the United States but why. One obvious possibility would be that American foreign aid, to put it crudely, buys votes: American leaders use foreign assistance to induce cooperation. If this is the case, increases in American aid should be followed by an increased coincidence of votes in the U.N. on issues considered to be important by the U.S. Wang (1999) tests this hypothesis by examining the voting records of sixty-five developing countries from 1984 to 1993 and finds that an increase in American foreign aid generally precedes an increase in voting alignment; moreover, the positive relationship between the two is very unlikely (again, p<0.05) to be the result of chance. Absent statistical techniques, the effects of American aid could be debated one anecdote at a time without any conclusion in sight. Even the most meticulous case selection and comparison could never produce such precise results.

A final strength of the statistical method is the fact that it conveys the ability to test two explanations against one another with remarkable precision. For example, while tests of realist and of domestic-political explanations of conflict typically limit themselves to ruling out chance associations, Clarke (2001) tests realism against two domestic-political explanations. He finds that realism “either does as well as the rival or better than the rival” theory (28).7

#### (2) EXPLICIT DISCLOSURE OF DATA PROMOTES ACCURACY – WE USE A REGRESSION MODEL OF SHARED DATA FROM 49 PAPERS CONTAINING OVER 1148 TEST STATISTICS

Wicherts et al 2011

[Jelte M. Wicherts\*, Marjan Bakker, Dylan Molenaar Psychology Department, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands "Willingness to Share Research Data Is Related to the Strength of the Evidence and the Quality of Reporting of Statistical Results" PLoS ONE 6(11)] [http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi %2F10. 1371%2Fjournal.pone.0026828]

In the current study, we related the willingness to share data from 49 papers published in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology or Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,Memory, and Cognition to two relevant characteristics of the statistical outcomes reported in the papers, namely the internal consistency of the statistical results and the distribution of significantly reported (p,.05) p-values. We restricted the attention to JPSP and JEP:LMC, because (1) authors in these journals were more willing to share data than authors in the other journals from which Wicherts et al. requested data, (2) no corresponding authors in these two journals declined to share data, because they were part of an ongoing project or because of propriety rightsor ethical considerations, and (3) studies in these two journals were fairly homogeneous in terms of analysis and design (mostly lab experiments).

CARD CONTINUES

Errors in the Reporting of Statistical Results The 49 papers contained a total of 1148 test statistics that were presented as significant at p,.05 . Table 1 presents for each paper the number of significantly reported test results, the number of misreporting errors, and the median and average of all genuinely significant p-values (as based on the recalculated values). Forty-nine of these statistics (4.3%) were inconsistent with the reported (range of) pvalues. In forty-seven of the inconsistent results (95.9%), the reported p-value (range) was smaller than the recalculated p-value. Figure 1 gives the origin of three types reporting errors. Although 51.1% (587) of the tests statistics from papers from which no data were shared, most incorrectly reported p-values (36 out of 49; 73.5%) originated from these papers. These errors include quite small ones (e.g., p=.0002 reported as p,.0001). Twenty-eight of the 32 p-values (87.5%) were incorrectly reported at the level of the 2nd decimal (e.g., =.02 reported as p,.01) were from papers from which no data shared. Negative binomial regressions (Table 2) that accounted for the number of test statistics and the average p- values in each paper (see below) showed that reluctance to share data was predictive of the prevalence of both types of reporting errors

CARD CONTINUES

In this sample of psychology papers, the authors ’ reluctance to share data was associated with more errors in reporting of statistical results and with relatively weaker evidence (against the null hypothesis) . The documented errors are arguably the tip of the iceberg of potential errors and biases in statistical analyses and the reporting of statistical results. It is rather disconcerting that roughly 50% of published papers in psychology contain reporting errors [33] and that the unwillingness to share data was most pronounced when the errors concerned statistical significance .

Although our results are consistent with the notion that the reluctance to share data is generated by the author’s fear that reanalysis will expose errors and lead to opposing views on the results, our results are correlational in nature and so they are open to alternative interpretations. Although the two groups of papers are similar in terms of research fields and designs, it is possible that they differ in other regards. Notably, statistically rigorous researchers may archive their data better and may be more attentive towards statistical power than less statistically rigorous researchers. If so, more statistically rigorous researchers will more promptly share their data, conduct more powerful tests, and so report lower p-values. However, a check of the cell sizes in both categories of papers (see Text S2) did not suggest that statistical power was systematically higher in studies from which data were shared.

The association between reporting errors and sharing of data after results are published may also reflect differences in the rigor with which researchers manage their data. Rigorously working researchers may simply commit fewer reporting errors because they manage and archive their data more diligently. A recent survey among 192 Dutch psychological researchers highlighted a rather poor practice of data archiving in psychology [36]. When asked whether they archived their research data, only a third of the psychologists responded positively. This is remarkable in light of guidelines of the APA [11] that stipulate that data should be retained a minimum of five years after publication of the study. Even among those psychologists who indicated that they “archive” their data, most did not follow proper archiving standards (e.g., by keeping code books and writing meta-data [37]), but simply stored data on their own (current) computer (32%), on CDs/DVDs (18%), or on the shelf (20%). Haphazard data management is documented in a number of scientific fields [37,38,39], may result in errors in analyzing and reporting of results, and obviously impedes the sharing of data after results are published. Regardless of the underlying processes, the results on the basis of the current papers imply that it is most difficult to verify published statistical results when these are contentious. We focused here on NHST within two psychology journals and so it isdesirable to replicate our results in other fields and in the context of alternative statistical approaches. However, it is likely that similar problems play a role in the widespread reluctance to share data in other scientific fields [13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. Because existing guidelines on data sharing offer little promise for improvement [40], progress in psychological science and related fields would benefit from having research data itself be part of the process of replication [15,16], notably by the establishment by journals, professional organizations, and granting bodies of mandatory data archiving policies. More stringent policies concerning data archiving will not only facilitate verification of analyses and corrections of the scientific record, but also improve the quality of reporting of statistical results. Changing policies require better educational training in data management and data archiving, which is currently suboptimal in many fields [36,37,38,39]. On the other hand,technical capabilities for storage are already available. For instance, several trial registers in the medical sciences (like clinicaltrials.gov) enable storage of research data. Rigorous archiving of data involves documentation of variables, meta-data, saving data files in formats that are robust (e.g., ASCII files), and submitting files to repositories that already require these standards. Best practices in conducting analyses and reporting statistical results involve, for instance, that all co-authors hold copies of the data, and that at least two of the authors independently run all the analyses (as we did in this study). Such double-checks and the possibility for others to independently verify results later should go a long way in dealing with human factors in the conduct of statistical analyses and the reporting of results.

Table 2 –Negative Binomial Regressions

